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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ILLINOIS:
REVIEW AND REAPPRAISAL
Brian R. McKillip*
Despite an unfavorable judicial attitude toward the doctrine of
punitive damages, it has remained a viable element of tort actions
in Illinois. In this Article, Mr. McKillip considers the development
of the doctrine in Illinois and its application in specific areas of
tort law. Since an award of punitive damages does not always
serve its intended purposes, the author concludes that its inherent
defects warrant a limitation in its application, if not complete
abandonment of the doctrine.
"Punitive," "exemplary" or "vindictive" damages are almost univer-
sally recognized in the United States.' Although the practice of
awarding damages in excess of full compensation has been subject to
criticism, both on and off the bench, 2 it retains its position as the sole
exception to the compensatory nature of tort damages. As early as
1872, an Illinois court concluded that the concept of punitive dam-
ages was "too firmly rooted in our jurisprudence to be disturbed." 3
However, Illinois courts have continued to display an unfavorable at-
titude toward punitive damages, thereby enhancing the possibility
that one day a wholesale reevaluation will take place.
I. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ILLINOIS: AN OVERVIEW
A. Common Law Principles
Commentators have traced the origin of punitive damages to
Eighteenth Century England, when the doctrine first was used to
* Member of Illinois Bar; A.B. Loyola University (Chicago) (1968); J.D. Loyola University
(Chicago) (1972). Mr. McKillip is presently engaged in private practice in Wheaton, Illinois.
The author would like to express his appreciation to the members of the law firm of
McKenna, Storer, Rowe, White & Ferrug for their encouragement and assistance in the prep-
aration of this article.
1. Four states do not allow recovery of punitive damages. Louisiana: Vincent v. Morgan's
Louisiana & Texas R.R. & S.S. Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917); Massachusetts: Boott Mills
v. Boston & Maine R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1914); Nebraska: Abel v. Conover, 170
Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); Washington: Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, 2 Wash.
45, 25 P. 1072 (1891). England has, except in certain specific instances, abolished punitive
damages. Rookes v. Barnard, (1964) A.C. 1129.
2. See, e.g., Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 ll.2d 31, 330 N.E. 2d 509 (1975);
Holmes v. Holmes, 64 Ill. 294 (1872); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 16 Am. Rep. 270 (1873).
The court expressed its dissatisfaction in no uncertain terms. "It is an unsightly and unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry and the body of the law." Id.at 382, 16 Am. Rep. at 320.
See generally, Chiardi, Should Punitive Damages Be Abolished-A Statement for the Affirnna-
tive, 1964-65 A.B.A. SECTION ON INS., NEGLIGENCE & COMPENSATION LAw 282; Willis, Mea-
sure of Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARv. L.
REv. 419 (1909).
3. Holmes v. Holmes, 64 II1. 294, 298 (1872).
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justify jury verdicts in excess of the plaintiffs actual harm. 4  By this
means, the plaintiff was "compensated" for elements of damage not
then recoverable at common law. Eventually, however, recoverable
damages were expanded to embrace intangibles, such as pain and
suffering. As a result, the void that punitive damages originally were
intended to fill had been satisfied.
Evidence of the doctrine's transformation is apparent in a compari-
son of early Illinois cases dealing with the doctrine. In 1845, the Il-
linois Supreme Court in McNamara v. King' sustained an award of
exemplary damages in order "not only to compensate the plaintiff but
to punish the defendant." 6 By 1921, however, the supreme court in
Eshelman v. Rawalt 7 made no allusion to any compensatory function
to be served by the doctrine, offering punishment and deterrence as
the sole purposes of punitive awards. 8  Thus, although the original
purpose for punitive damages had been served by other means, the
doctrine remained, adopting as its sole justification what had origi-
nally been merely a convenient rationale.
Today, even though it is well-settled that punishment and deter-
rence are the objectives of the punitive damages, 9 the circumstances
which will warrant the application of this doctrine are less clear. In
general, the plaintiff may recover punitive damages if the defendant
is guilty of "willful and wanton" misconduct. The jury is instructed as
follows:
If you find that defendant was guilty of willful and wanton conduct
which proximately caused injury to the plaintiff and if you believe
that justice and the public good require it, you may, in addition to
any damages to which you find plaintiff entitled, award plaintiff an
amount which will serve to punish the defendant and to deter
others from the commission of like offenses. 10
Willful and wanton misconduct is defined for the jury as "a course of
action which shows actual or deliberate intention to harm or which, if
not intentional, shows an utter indifference to or conscious disregard
of a person's own safety and the safety of others." I'
4. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARV. L. REv. 517, (1957); Note,
Punitive Damages - Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. - Punitive Damages Nonrecoverable
Under the Illinois Survival Act, 7 Loy. CHI. L.J. 811 (1976).
5. 7 Ill. 432, 2 Gilman 432 (1845).
6. Id. at 436.
7. 298 Il1. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921).
8. Id. at 197, 131 N.E. at 677.
9. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 1ll.2d 31, 35, 330 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1975).
10. ILL. PATrERN JURY INSTR. § 35.01 (2d ed. 1971).
11. Id. § 14.01 Willful and wanton conduct is also at issue (1) where the plaintiff seeks to
recover in spite of his own contributory negligence based upon willful and wanton conduct by
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On numerous occasions Illinois courts have attempted to define
those circumstances which justify an award of punitive damages. The
variety of descriptions used illustrates the difficulty encountered in
attempting to define culpable conduct. Definitions include: "wanton
acts and malice,"l" "aggravating circumstances such as wantonness,
willfulness, malice, fraud or violence," 13 "willfulness, wantonness or
recklessness," 14 "wantonness, malice, oppression or circumstances of
aggravation," 15 and "wanton disregard of the plaintiffs rights." 16
These descriptions are imprecise and vary according to the cir-
cumstances of each case. Accordingly, courts and juries have broad
discretion in defining and penalizing "wanton" conduct, and that dis-
cretion is restricted in only two respects. First, the court may rule as
a question of law upon the propriety of an award. 17 Secondly, puni-
tive damages may not be awarded absent actual or nominal dam-
ages.1 8  Nevertheless, once actual damages are established, the jury is
accorded great latitude in determining the size of the award. 19
Illinois courts have refused to limit punitive damages to an amount
proportional to the actual damages sustained.20 Although the Third
District Appellate Court noted in an 1894 decision 2 ' that punitive
damages could well be proportioned to the harm intended by the
defendant rather than the harm actually done, 22 this principle has not
found additional support in Illinois case law. Additional factors which
may be considered include expenses and attorney's fees incurred by
the plaintiff in prosecuting the action, 23 and the wealth of the defend-
the defendant, Green v. Keenan, 10 I11. App.2d 53, 134 N.E.2d 115 (2d Dist. 1956); (2) where
the plaintiff is a trespasser or a social guest, Briney v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 401 Ill. 181, 81
N.E.2d 866 (1948); Ciaglo v. Ciaglo, 20 Ill. App.2d 360, 156 N.E.2d 376 (1st Dist. 1959); or (3)
where a student seeks damages from a teacher or school for injuries sustained in school ac-
tivities, Kobylanski v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 63 Ill.2d 165, 347 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
12. Kimes v. Trapp, 52 I11. App.2d 442, 202 N.E.2d 42, 45 (3d Dist. 1964).
13. City of Chicago v. Shayne, 46 111. App.2d 33, 38, 196 N.E.2d 521, 524 (1st Dist. 1964).
14. Cunningham v. Brown, 22 ll.2d 23, 29, 174 N.E.2d 153, 156 (1961).
15. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 87, 174 N.E.2d 157, 165 (1961).
16. Zokoych v. Spalding, 36 IIl. App.3d 654, 671, 344 N.E.2d 805, 819 (1st Dist. 1976).
17. Knierim v. Izzo, 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961); Delano v. Collins, 49 III. App.3d
791, 364 N.E.2d 716 (4th Dist. 1977).
18. Tonchen v. All-Steel Equip., Inc., 13 I11. App.3d 454, 300 N.E.2d 616 (2d Dist. 1973).
19. Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 111. 192, 131 N.E. 675 (1921).
20. Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285 (7th Cir. 1969); Gass v. Gamble-
Skogmo, Inc., 357 F.2d 215 (7th Cir. 1966). But see Selimos v. Christ, 331 I11. App. 412, 73
N.E.2d 152 (1st Dist. 1947).
21. Hildreth v. Hancock, 55 111. App. 572, 574 (3d Dist. 1894), affd, 156 Ill. 618, 41 N.E.
155 (1895).
22. Id. at 574-75. (emphasis added).
23. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 111. 549, 46 N.E.2d 41 (1943); Smith v. Dunaway, 77 111. App.2d 1,
221 N.E.2d 665 (5th Dist. 1966).
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ant.24 In practical terms, the jury is asked to make a subjective or
even emotional evaluation of the defendant's conduct. Therefore, un-
stated factors are also inherent in these jury awards.
B. Statutory Recoveries
While it is unclear whether punitive damages "have always been
recoverable at common law,"-2 5 (as one appellate court has asserted)
they are now generally recoverable in most common law actions.26
However, this is not true of statutory actions. Because statutory rem-
edies typically are enacted in derogation of the common law, they
must be construed strictly. Thus,' a court is without power to imply
additional conditions or terms in the statute.2 7  Absent clear legisla-
tive intent to authorize such damages, they remain outside the pur-
view of the statute and the plaintiffs lawsuit.
Consistent with these principles, Illinois courts permit recovery of
punitive damages in the common law actions of assault and battery,28
products liability, 29 and libel and slander.30  However, such damages
are not recoverable under the Structural Work Act,31 which limits
recovery to actual damages sustained by reason of a willful 32 violation
of its provisions. 3 On the other hand, a prior version of the Dram
24. But cf., Toledo, N & W.R. Co. v. Smith, 51 11. 517 (1871); Chicago City R. Co. v.
Henry, 62 Ill. 142 (1871); Smith v. Wunderlich, 70 I11. 426 (1873).
25. See Madison v. Wigal, 18 I11. App.2d 564, 571, 153 N.E.2d 90, 94 (2d Dist. 1958).
26. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 21 111. App.3d 46, 51 313 N.E.2d 496, 499 (2d
Dist. 1974). But see Knierim v. Izzo, 22 11.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 157 (1961).
27. Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 11 111. App.3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365
(4th Dist. 1973).
28. See, e.g., Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554, 558 (7th Cir. 1974).
29. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 III. App.2d 109, 253 N.E.2d 636 (lst Dist. 1969), affd 46
1ll.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
30. See, e.g., Gasbarra v. Park-Ohio, Inc., 382 F. Supp. 399, 403 (N.D. II1. 1974).
31. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48 § 69 (1975).
32. Note, however, that "willful" as used in the Structural Work Act is not equivalent to
"willful" for purposes of punitive damages. "Under the [Structural Work] Act, 'wilful' refers to a
situation where the defendant actually had knowledge or should have had knowledge." Assise v.
Dawe's Laboratories, Inc., 7 I11. App.3d 1045, 1047-48, 288 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1st Dist. 1972).
See also ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 93 § 10.07 (1975) creating a similar cause of action for violation of
the Mine Safety Act.
33. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 § 69 (1975) provides that "a right of action shall accrue to the
party injured, for any direct damages sustained .... " This statute has not been interpreted to
sanction awards for punitive damages. Baird v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 11 Ill.
App.3d 264, 296 N.E.2d 365 (4th Dist. 1973). Moreover the supreme court's practice of strict
statutory interpretation makes such an expansion of the "direct damages" language unlikely.
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Shop Act 34 supported awards of punitive damages, because of express
language contained in the Act. 35
Survival acts 36 also preclude the recovery of punitive damages. At
common law a cause of action for injury died with the person. No suit
could be maintained by his heirs or estate, even for the recovery of
purely compensatory damages. 37 However, survival acts have abro-
gated this doctrine of abatement to a great extent. Nevertheless,
since survival acts are in derogation of the common law, strict in-
terpretation prohibits recovery of punitive damages. 38 Similarly, at
common law, the survivors of the decedent did not have a cause of
action for their losses occasioned by the decedent's wrongful death.
The Wrongful Death Act, 39 first adopted in Illinois in 1853, estab-
lished such a cause of action. But as in the case of the survival acts,
the rules of statutory construction prevent recovery of punitive dam-
ages. 40
II. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN THREE TORT CONTEXTS: THE PRINCIPAL-
AGENT RELATIONSHIP, INSURANCE AND DEATH
At present, punitive damages are intended to serve two purposes:
punishment of the wrongdoer and deterrence of similar conduct.
However, these purposes are not achieved if punitive damages are
imposed upon someone other than the wrongdoer. Moreover, they
are frustrated when a wrongdoer is excused from responding in puni-
tive damages solely by reason of his victim's death.
Accordingly, any application of punitive damages requires careful
analysis, with special concern that the doctrine's objectives be met.
Review of Illinois decisions in the areas of principal-agent relation-
34. An Act Relating to Alcoholic Liquors, § 14, Art. 6, 1934 ILL. LAWS. "Every ... person,
who shall be injured . . .shall have a right of action . . . for all damages sustained, and for
exemplary damages." Id. The existing provisions of the Act do not contain any reference to
exemplary damages, but do contain limitations on the amount recoverable. ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
43, § 135 (1975). Such limitations preclude a common law action in tort to recover punitive
damages, even if the award is within the statutory limits. See Cunningham v. Brown, 22 III.2d
23, 29, 174 N.E.2d 153, 157 (1961). See also The Public Utilities Act, ILL. REV. STAT., ch.
111-2/3, § 77 (1975), Churchill v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co., 46 I11. App.3d 781, 789, 362
N.E.2d 356, 363 (4th Dist. 1977) (a person who is "affected" by a violation of the Public
Utilities Act may recover punitive damages).
35. See note 34 supra.
36. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 339 (1975).
37. "Actio personalis moritor cum persona" (actions in persons deceased die with the per-
son). C. GREGORY & H. KALVEN JR., CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 552 (2d ed. 1969).
38. See Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
39. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, § 1 (1975).
40. See Conant v. Griffen, 48 Ill. 410, 413 (1868).
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ship, insurance coverage and death show that Illinois courts have not
been consistent in insuring that these objectives be achieved.
A. Punitive Damages and the Principal-Agent Relationship
As in many jurisdictions, Illinois courts have experienced difficulty
in deciding when punitive damages may be levied against a principal
for the willful misconduct of his agent. Most older Illinois decisions
held the principal liable in punitive damages under the doctrine of
respondeat superior. 4 1 The only aberration appeared in an 1873 de-
cision, Grund v. Van Vleck. 42  In this decision, the supreme court
reversed a jury award of punitive damages in a trespass action
brought by a tenant against both her landlord and the landlord's
agent. The court treated the issue as if it were a matter of first
impression, 4 3 and held the landlord liable solely for compensatory
damages. 4 4 Nevertheless, the Grund court avoided a comprehensive
analysis of problems created by imposing punitive damages vicari-
ously.
Recently, in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., a5 the Illinois
Supreme Court reexamined the issue. In this case, the plaintiff
sought to hold an employer liable for the willful acts of his employee.
The plaintiff claimed that punitive damages could be imposed upon
the employer under a common law action for wrongful death, even
though the interpretation of the existing wrongful death statute pre-
cluded such recovery. Although the court found the employer liable,
it refused to recognize a common law wrongful death act permitting
punitive damages. 46  Moreover, the court noted that "the punitive
and admonitory justifications for the imposition of ... [such] damages
are sharply diminished in those cases in which liability is imposed
vicariously." 47
The supreme court then proceeded, in dictum, to approve the limi-
tations set out in the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 4 8  The Re-
statement provides that "punitive damages can properly be awarded
41. See, e.g., Chicago Rock Island & Pac. By. v. Herring, 57 I11. 59 (1870); Dinsmoor v.
Wolber, 85 I11. App. 152 (2d Dist. 1899).
42. 69 I11. 478 (1873).
43. The court seemed unaware of the precedent it created three years previously in
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. By. v. Herring, 57 I11. 59 (1870).
44. 69 111. at 481.
45. 61 1ll.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
46. See notes 62 & 63 and accompanying text infra.
47. 61 Ill.2d at 36, 330 N.E.2d at 512.
48. id.
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against a master or other principal because of an act by an agent if,
but only if," 49 (1) the principal had authorized the act; (2) the princi-
pal had been reckless in employing an unfit agent; (3) the agent per-
formed in a managerial capacity and acted within the scope of this
employment; or (4) the principal ratified or approved the act.50 In so
doing, the court urged that vicarious liability of a principal for willful
and wanton misconduct of his agent should be of limited scope.
An appellate court decision from the Fifth District further justifies
and explains the Mattyasovszky rationale. In Tolle v. Interstate Systems
Truck Lines, 51 the court noted that the deterrent effect of punitive
damages is minimal where adjustments in employer supervision will
fail to prevent employee misconduct. 52 The court concluded that, in
such cases, it would be unfair to permit punitive awards absent delib-
erate participation by the principal. 53
In light of Mattyasovszky and Tolle, it appears likely that the Il-
linois Supreme Court will approve an award of punitive damages only
when their imposition will serve to deter the principal's or agent's
wrongful conduct.
B. Punitive Damages and the Insurance Policy
An important issue that remains largely unresolved in Illinois con-
cerns the payment of punitive damages under a liability policy. The
First District Appellate Court is one of the only Illinois courts to
address this problem directly. 54  In Scott v. Instant Parking, Inc., 55
the plaintiff had recovered a judgment against the defendant which
included an award of $10,000.00 punitive damages. In a citation pro-
ceeding 56 against the defendant's insurance carrier, the plaintiff
sought recovery of the entire judgment. The court held that the pol-
icy included coverage for punitive damages assessed for willful and
wanton misconduct. Construing language in the defendant's insurance
policy, it reasoned that the terms "caused by accident" included
events which occurred as a result of "willful and wanton miscon-
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 217 C (1957).
50. Id.
51. 42 I11. App.3d 771, 356 N.E.2d 625 (5th Dist. 1976) (automobile accident injury caused
by willful and wanton misconduct by defendant's employee truck driver).
52. Id. at 773, 356 N.E.2d at 627.
53. Id. at 774, 356 N.E.2d at 627-28.
54. See also Hawthorne v. Frost, 348 Ill. App. 279, 108 N.E.2d 816 (1st Dist. 1952) (liabil-
ity of cab company for damages caused by taxi driver's unprovoked assault on a motorist).
55. 105 Ill. App.2d 133, 245 N.E.2d 124 (1st Dist. 1969).
56. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 72 (1975).
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duct.'" 57 The court also held that coverage was not contrary to pub-
lic policy, for the defendant had not insured against his own acts but
against those of his employees.
It must be noted that the employer in Scott was liable for punitive
damages by reason of vicarious liability rather than for its own willful
or wanton act. The Scott court thereby permitted Illinois employers
to insure against losses occasioned by culpable acts of their
employees. However, the court did not address the larger issue of
whether an employer or anyone else may insure against punitive
damages for their own misconduct. The modern trend 58 is to con-
clude that coverage of punitive damages by an insurance policy is
contrary to public policy, even if within the terms of the policy.
One prominent author has argued that automobile liability insur-
ance should provide coverage for punitive damages except where the
defendant's conduct is "grossly violative of public policy." 59 The
basis for this position appears to be that the insurer has not specifi-
cally excluded coverage and the insured expects all damages to be
paid on his behalf. While this argument may have validity in refer-
ence to compensatory damages imposed for the wanton acts of an
insured, it cannot "apply with equal force to punitive damages,0 for
it ignores the purpose for awarding such damages. If punitive dam-
ages are to accomplish the stated objectives of punishment and de-
terrence, they must effect a hardship on the guilty party. Insurance
coverage leaves the defendant unscathed, imposes the loss on inno-
cent policyholders, and accomplishes merely a windfall recovery for
the plaintiff.
Adherence to the objectives of punitive damages also indicates that
even the limited holding in Scott is ill-advised. If justification exists to
impose punishment on an employer for the conduct of his employee,
the punishment should be borne by the employer rather than his
insurance company. The argument that the employer is innocent of
wrongdoing is grounds to preclude an award of punitive damages
against the employer initially, but not to shift the burden of punish-
ment to an equally innocent insurance company.
57. 105 II1. App.2d at 137, 245 N.E.2d at 126.
58. Annot., 20 A.L.R.3d 343 (1968); Haskell, Punitive Damages: The Public Policy and the
Insurance Policy, 58 ILL. B.J. 780 (1970). See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Cas. v. McNulty, 307
F.2d 432 (1962).
59. J. APPLEMAN, 7 INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312 (Cum. Supp. 1977). See also
Appleman, 58 ILL. B.J. 85' (1969-70) (letter to the editor).
60. id.
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C. Death and Punitive Damages
No reported Illinois case has ruled on the issue of whether punitive
damages may be recovered in the event that the tortfeasor dies prior
to judgment. However, the basic objectives of punitive damages
would seem to compel an Illinois court to follow the majority rule and
to deny recovery of punitive damages against the decedent's es-
tate.61 Since punitive damages are not intended to compensate the
plaintiff but are imposed only in the interests of society, abatement of
the right to recover such damages upon the defendant's death does
not operate as a hardship on the plaintiff. Moreover, the death of the
defendant renders the punitive effect of the doctrine unnecessary and
undesirable. To assess punitive damages against the tortfeasor's estate
would impose the punishment upon the innocent heirs of the
tortfeasor.
On the other hand, the death of the victim raises entirely different
considerations but affects similar, if incongruous, results. Recent deci-
sions have expanded the allowable recovery under the Survival Act,
permitting, for example, an award for conscious pain and suffering of
the decedent.6 2  Yet the Illinois Supreme Court in Mattyasovszky
found nothing to warrant "a change in the law of this State which for
more than a hundred years has limited recovery under the Survival
Act to compensatory damages." 63 Moreover, the court also rejected
the opportunity to establish a common law action for wrongful death
which would have included punitive damages within the scope of po-
tential recovery.6 4
The court's rulings were founded primarily on principles of statu-
tory construction, principles whose very application is made neces-
sary by reason of efforts to cure deficiencies in the development of
the common law. 65 Nevertheless, permitting punishment of the de-
fendant who injures his victim but not of the defendant who kills his
victim is an anomaly which defies logic.
Analysis of Illinois law within the areas discussed illustrates two
important considerations in future development of the doctrine. First,
the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence must be the primary
61. C.J.S. Damages § 125(3) (1966).
62. See Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 1Il.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583 (1974).
63. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d 31, 33, 330 N.E.2d 509, 510 (1975).
64. Id. at 34-37, 330 N.E.2d at 510-11.
65. See notes 36-38 and accompanying text supra. Had the common law recognized an ac-
tion for wrongful death, neither interpretation of a statute nor application of the principles of
statutory construction would have been necessary.
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goals of any punitive damages award. The Illinois Supreme Court
evidenced this concern by its suggested limitations in application of
the doctrine in the principal-agent context. Similar caution should be
exercised if and when the court addresses the issue of insurance
coverage for punitive damages.
Secondly, examination of the court's treatment of the issue of death
and punitive damages reveals that the court has given little if any
consideration to whether punishment and deterrence would be
served by expanding the doctrine to embrace death actions. Instead,
it has availed itself of the opportunity to express its reluctance,
perhaps even hostility, toward any application of the doctrine of puni-
tive damages.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S ATTITUDE TOWARD PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Illinois courts long have been disenchanted with the concept of
punitive damages. As early as 1872 the supreme court, in Holmes v.
Holmes, 66 seriously questioned the validity of the doctrine. Citing
Professor Greenleaf's argument, the court stated that "damages
should be precisely commensurate with the injury, neither more nor
less." 6 7 The Holmes court also noted that it was inconsistent to mix
the "supposed interests of society" 68 with those of a plaintiff seeking
redress for a private injury in a civil damages action.
Recent analysis of the doctrine by the court indicates that little has
occurred in the century since the Holmes decision to excise the de-
fects of the doctrine. In 1961, the supreme court in Knierim v. Izzo 69
reversed that portion of a trial court's order which had dismissed the
plaintiff's complaint seeking actual and punitive damages for the in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress. The defendant allegedly
threatened to kill the plaintiff's husband and then proceeded to carry
out the threat. The high court adopted the plaintiff's theory of the
case and recognized the "new tort" of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress. In so doing, the court stated that the cause of action
would not lie for mere trivial affronts, but only for intentional acts
calculated to cause severe emotional disturbance. 70 Surprisingly, the
court also held that the plaintiff could not recover punitive damages
in such an action. Conceding that defendant's conduct could be
66. 64 Ill. 294, 298 (1872).
67. Id. at 297, quoting 2 GREENLEAF, EVIDENCE § 253, and n.2.
68. Id. at 297-98.
69. 22 Ill.2d 73, 174 N.E.2d 317 (1961).
70. Id. at 88, 174 N.E.2d at 165.
[Vol. 27:571
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characterized as wanton, malicious and oppressive, the court
nevertheless refused to authorize such damages. It reasoned that
"since the outrageous quality of the defendant's conduct forms the
basis of the action, the rendition of compensatory damages will be
sufficiently punitive." 71
The decision in Knierim v. Izzo can be criticized on the grounds
that compensatory damages may not punish the defendant suffi-
ciently. Regardless of the merits of its rationale, however, the in-
teresting aspect of the Knierim decision is the court's disfavorable
treatment. of punitive damages. The court refused to extend the doc-
trine despite the similarities between the new tort and other causes
of action for intentional and malicious misconduct.
The court's attitude toward the doctrine was expressed most re-
cently in Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co. 72 In rejecting the
opportunity to extend the doctrine of punitive damages to survival
actions and death actions, the court discussed the objectives and op-
eration of the doctrine. The court's commentary was directed toward
comparing the punitive and deterrent purposes of the criminal law
with the effectiveness of such goals in the civil law doctrine of puni-
tive damages. Its evaluation, while not openly critical, was clearly
negative. 73 A comprehensive examination of the points raised by the
71. Id.
72. 61 ll.2d 31, 330 N.E.2d 509 (1975).
73. The Illinois Supreme Court has recently addressed the issue of punitive damage awards
in death actions. In Churchill v. Norfolk & Western By. Co., No. 49421 (I11. Sup. Ct. 1977),
the plaintiff-widow brought suit to recover damages against the defendant railroad for the death
of her husband, an automobile passenger killed in an auto-train collision. In addition to the
Wrongful Death action, the plaintiff sought both compensatory and punitive damages under the
Public Utilities Act. The plaintiff contended that because she had become liable for her hus-
band's funeral expenses, she was a person "affected" by a violation of that Act and, therefore,
entitled to recover punitive damages as provided for in the Act. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111/3,
§ 77 (1969).
The lower court rearranged and reinstated jury verdicts of $45,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff
as administratrix under the Wrongful Death Act, $1,600.00 for the plaintiff individually under
the Family Expense Act, and $600,000.00 punitive damages for the plaintiff individually under
the Public Utilities Act. 46 I11. App.3d 781, 794, 362 N.E.2d 356, 366 (4th Dist. 1977).
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision with respect to
the compensatory damage awards and reversed on the issue of punitive damages. However, in
considering the issue of punitive damages, the court did not address plaintiff's contention that
because she incurred funeral expenses for the death of her husband she was a person "affected"
by the Public Utilities Act. Instead, the court interpreted plaintiff's claim for punitive damages
as a wrongful death action arising out of a violation of the Public Utilities Act. No. 49421 at 3.
As a result, while the court may have correctly determined that the Act does not create a cause
of action for a person's death, the court failed to respond to the issue of whether plaintiff was
otherwise entitled to recover punitive damages as a person "affected" by a violation of the Act.
Although the court's analysis in this regard is questionable, the ultimate reversal of the puni-
tive damages award is not surprising in light of the earlier Illinois Supreme Court decision in
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
Mattyasovszky opinion reveals that reform of this doctrine is both
possible and warranted in light of the supreme court's attitude.
IV. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN ACHIEVING
PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE
It cannot be denied that in the absence of insurance coverage,
punitive damages achieve the objective of punishing the defendant.
Moreover, society clearly has a right, and even a duty, to punish
conduct that it deems contrary to the public well-being. Indeed,
punishment inflicted for the sole purpose of causing pain may be con-
sidered one of the very foundations of our legal system. As noted by
Justice Holmes:
It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for
vengeance ...
The statement may be made stronger still, and it may be said, not
only that the law does, but that it ought to, make the gratification
of revenge an object. 74
Punishment inflicted upon a wrongdoer through the legal process
satisfies, to a great extent, the victim's and society's "desire for re-
venge" and renders self-help unnecessary. 75 A base instinct is met in
a civilized manner and order is maintained.
However, the punishment and deterrence of wrongdoers generally
has been the responsibility of the criminal law, which has developed
safeguards to insure that punishment will be fair. These safeguards
have not been adopted in civil actions even when the object of that
action changes from compensation to pufiishment.
For example, a fine imposed upon a criminal defendant is carefully
circumscribed by statute. By contrast, a civil defendant is subjected
to punitive damages in an amount within the discretion of the
jury. 76  The jury is without special training or experience in per-
forming this task, and is given no guidance in determining an appro-
priate fine. Finally, in determining the amount of the fine, the jury is
Mattyasovszky. Thus, while the court acknowledges the inconsistencies which result from Illinois
application of the doctrine, No. 49421 at 6, it is unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court's
unfavorable attitude toward punitive damages will change in the near future.
74. 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 40-41 (1881).
75. Note, Criminal Safeguards and the Punitive Damages Defendant, 34 U. CHi L. REV.
408 (1967).
76. See text accompanying notes 10-19 supra.
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allowed to consider the plaintiff's costs and attorney's fees-factors
which are not relevant to the issue of punishment.
77
Another safeguard of the criminal system requires that the legisla-
ture define the specific conduct which will render an individual sub-
ject to punishment. Such statutes particularly dictate the requisite
mental intent. Punitive damages, on the other hand, may be imposed
upon a defendant for "willful and wanton conduct." The meaning of
this phrase is less than clear. Other descriptions such as "malicious,"
"oppressive," and "aggravating" provide additional bases for argument
by attorneys and courts, but no better warning of what conduct will
be deemed culpable. In addressing this problem, the First District
Appellate Court noted:
It is difficult, if not impossible, to lay down a short and simple
governing rule on this subject. Much comfort can be found in cases
presented by both sides to this issue, because whether an act is
willful and wanton is greatly dependent upon the particular cir-
cumstances of each case. Valid jury questions of willful and wanton
conduct have been presented by as little as misjudging the distance
of an approaching automobile, ... and failing to look before mak-
ing a left turn. 78
The Illinois Supreme Court also has had difficulty defining the
conduct punitive damages is intended to punish. It has noted that
"situations in which punitive damages become an issue cover a broad
spectrum that ranges from the intentional tort which is also a crime,
• ..to what we characterize today as 'willful and wanton conduct,' a
characterization that shades imperceptibly into simple negligence." 
79
Only when the defendant's act constitutes a crime as well as a
tort has society previously deemed that act punishable. Conse-
quently, in most cases willful and wanton conduct is whatever the
jury says it is, and the determination is made after the act has been
performed. Punishment is imposed for "crimes" established ex post
facto.
The injustice inherent in this failure to specify conduct deserving of
punishment is magnified when applied to acts which do not constitute
intentional acts. There exists a qualitative difference between inten-
tional acts and reckless acts. The former occur as a result of a con-
scious decision to proceed in violation of another's rights. The, latter
77. See notes 23 & 24 supra and accompanying text.
78. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co., 116 Ill. App.2d 109, 135-36, 253 N.E.2d 636, 648 (1st Dist.
1969), aff'd 46 Ill.2d 288, 263 N.E.2d 103 (1970).
79. Mattyasovszky v. West Towns Bus Co., 61 Ill.2d 31, 35, 330 N.E.2d 509, 511 (1975).
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results from unintentional lapses, however gross, from the standard of
conduct demanded by society. Unlike the intentional tortfeasor, who
is aware of his breach as he commits it, the reckless tortfeasor merely
has failed to take cognizance of the consequences of his act. While
neither tortfeasor may be excused from his conduct, the difference in
the nature of their acts should be considered in determining whether
their respective conduct should be punished.
Even if the civil law were to adopt safeguards from the criminal
system, it still is doubtful whether the stated goals of punitive dam-
ages ever could be achieved. Admittedly, deterrence constitutes an
objective which, if achieved, only can benefit society. Indeed, an ul-
timate goal of punishment must be deterrence, for punishment in and
of itself neither cures a wrong already committed nor prevents future
wrongs. However, the effectiveness of punitive damages in achieving
that goal is questionable.
There is a noticeable lack of empirical evidence to either confirm or
deny the deterrent effect of punitive damages. The criminal law sys-
tem, charged with primary responsibility for punishment and deter-
rence and eminently visible to the public, achieves uncertain success
at this task at best. 80 Moreover, if punitive damages has failed in its
objective of deterring undesirable conduct, the fault may be ascribed
in large part to the inability to specify the conduct sought to be de-
terred.
Even more basic, however, is whether imposition of punitive dam-
ages is ever capable of deterring reckless acts. A defendant guilty of
an intentional tort has, at some point, however briefly, made a con-
scious reflection on his intended act. It is at this time that the deter-
rent effect of punitive damages will operate, if at all. The reckless
actor, however, has failed to consider the immediate consequences of
his conduct, much less the more remote possibility of punitive dam-
ages. Under this circumstance, deterrence is a legal fiction.
In addition to the issue of effective deterrence, there remains a
question as to who should have the responsibility of punishing the
wron'gdoer. Courts repeatedly have reaffirmed the principle that
punishment is imposed in the interests of society. Moreover, society
alone should impose penalties for wrongful acts, for a corollary to
society's right to punish is society's exclusive possession of that right.
Yet, the doctrine of punitive damages allows a private individual to
act in society's behalf, and the fine extracted from a defendant in the
80. The continuing debate over the deterrent effect of capital punishment illustrates the
difficulty. See Forst, Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment, 61 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1971).
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name of society accrues solely to the plaintiff rather than the public.
But this aspect of punitive damages seems far less objectionable than
the potential for harm which exists by reason of the plaintiff's status
as surrogate prosecutor.
The overriding self-interest of the plaintiff in possible recovery of a
windfall award, over and above all amounts necessary to fairly com-
pensate him for his damages, inevitably will affect the plaintiff's abil-
ity to conduct the action in society's best interest. As noted by one
author, the plaintiff's position is analogous to that of a prosecuting
attorney whose compensation is based upon the number of convic-
tions obtained. 8' The juxtaposition -of the plaintiff's interests in
monetary reward and society's interest in fair and just punishment
creates a conflict of interest which, in the absence of the court's
careful scrutiny, will always be resolved in the plaintiff's favor.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Although there are inherent problems in the doctrine, certain ad-
vantages do accrue through the use of punitive damages. The lure of
a substantial recovery encourages plaintiffs to bring "to justice" those
guilty of crimes who inevitably escape the interest of the public pros-
ecutor. Moreover, certain torts, especially in the business and com-
mercial area, result not only in damage to the plaintiff, but benefit to
the defendant. An award of damages which merely is compensatory
conceivably may leave the guilty party in as good or better a position
than if he had not committed the tort. The law cannot countenance
this result. A tool must exist to prevent a guilty party from benefiting
by his own tortious act.
Nevertheless, the numerous and serious defects in the area of puni-
tive damages warrant substantial reformation of the doctrine. Some of
the defects, such as its questionable capacity to deter, are incapable
of being cured. Others, such as the lack of procedural safeguards in
the imposition of punishment, may not be corrected without unwar-
ranted and undesirable modifications to the compensatory nature of
civil damage actions. A possible solution might be complete aban-
donment of the doctrine, for the criminal law remains to punish that
conduct which society has specifically prohibited.
A less radical solution would be to limit the recovery of punitive
damages to intentional torts which constitute crimes or provide ben-
81. Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1931). Some courts
have recognized this potential for abuse. See Eshelman v. Rawalt, 298 Iil. 192, 197 (1921).
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efits to the defendant. By this means, may of the objectionable
features of the doctrine would be obviated and the benefits retained.
Criminal conduct normally ignored by prosecutors would be brought
before the court and punished appropriately. Moreover, those who
seek advantages by interfering with the rights of others, as is the case
in business torts, would find their actions frustrated. The ad hoc
method by which conduct presently is deemed punishable would be
exchanged, in many cases, for the certainty of the criminal code.
Whatever deterrent effect is provided by punitive damages would be
accomplished in the area of intentional acts which society has deemed
contrary to the public well-being.
Concededly, this proposal does not provide an ideal solution to the
problems presented by the doctrine, for certain defects remain.
Moreover, the deterrence of tortious conduct must remain a goal of
the law. Nevertheless, the dual interests of society in imposing
punishment in a fair and evenhanded manner, and in regulating the
conduct of its citizens may best be served by revising the doctrine of
punitive damages in Illinois.
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